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Report on Bulgaria: Elites’ Europeanness and  
their Trust in Institutions 
Dobrinka Kostova ∗ 
Abstract: »Ein Bericht über Bulgarien: Die Europäizität der Eliten und ihr Ver-
trauen gegenüber Institutionen«. The paper divulges a comparison between the 
Bulgarian elites, elites in the new democracies and in the old democracies of 
the European Union and succeeds in interrelating them by using common as-
sumptions, concepts and original and comprehensive empirical data. It shows 
that the European Union (EU) has been a forerunner and active proponent of 
the process of integration of Bulgaria in the recent decades and that the EU 
has played a significant role in mitigating its impact. The analysis on elites’ Eu-
ropeanness is backed-up by an extensive dataset revealing its constantly adapt-
ing nature; its diversity of practices; its repeated need to respond to exogenous 
challenges and, most importantly, its perpetually unsatisfactory quest to make 
“real existing democracy” conform better to “potentially ideal democracy.” The 
Bulgarian elites’ Europeanness is expressed in a high display of trust toward Eu-
ropean institutions. However, their trust to national ones is significantly lower. 
The explanations for these diversities are looked for in the continuity of histori-
cal experiences of trust to the state and its institutions, the short period of Eu-
ropean Union membership, the discontinuity during the hard economic trans-
formation and the deep social differences in society since the transition has 
begun. 
Keywords: Bulgaria, elites, Europeanness, integration, trust. 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper we are interested in Bulgarian elites analysing how the expecta-
tions and assessment of democracy, of the economic and political crises, the 
visions of European integration and solidarity, the attitudes to national and 
international challenges and institutional trust shape their Europeanness. Our 
overall strategy resembles most closely the strategy of Best, Lengyel, and Ver-
zichelli (2012) for the elitist character of the European integration and that of 
Kitschelt et al. (1999), which vocally denied that political structure in post-
socialist type of democracy was non-random and based on structured diversity. 
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We would like to show that political legacies, mediated by the rational strate-
gies of political actors, do matter for the emerging patterns of Europeanness 
and ultimately for the quality of post-communist democracies. Further, build-
ing on the vast work of survey research which points to an increasing trend of 
disaffection and dissatisfaction with democracy (Kostova 2014; Guasti 2014; 
Dimitrova and Buzogány 2014; Pharr and Putnam 2000; van Deth et al. 2007), 
and which documents the importance of the cultural predispositions for the way 
democracy works (Vachudova 2014; Bauer, Knill and Pitschel 2007; Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005; Kaase and Newton 1995; Putnam 1993), we will provide an 
overview of the deepening of European integration as balancing mechanism for 
the democratic deficits. We would like to present how the increasing legitimacy 
of the European institutions shapes the democratic content of the decision-
making process and its consequences for the strengthening of the ties of Bul-
garia with EU. 
The significant difference between Bulgaria and the other Eastern European 
countries on one side and the Western countries on the other is that institution-
alization in the East has still not reached the one in the West (Guasti 2014; 
Ugur 2013; Grabbe 2003). This means that stability in the rules and nature of 
party competition, the configuration of the party system between elections 
without the appearance of new challengers at each election, the volatility of the 
electoral outcome are low. More, the parties have no stable roots in society, 
which does not allow them to structure the preferences of the voters. As a con-
sequence, the parties’ relative ideological positions tend to be far from con-
sistent. Still some parties have not reached the level to be considered legitimate 
by the major political actors. Additionally, party organizations matter. They 
should not be subordinate to the interests of ambitious leaders as is the case 
with vast majority of Eastern European parties. In this regard it is difficult for 
them to acquire an independent status and value of their own.  
These circumstances are revealed to face many challenges in Bulgaria – 
great dynamics, institutional ineffectiveness leading to low trust to the elites 
that they can bring prosperity to the country, electoral mobility and low civil 
control over governance. All these contribute to unstable democratization of 
the country. The low level of institutional trust complicates the process of 
democratization and leads to ups and downs in the strength of acceptance of the 
basic rules of democratic political system. As a consequence the process of 
building the democratic structures and their good functioning is a slow, howev-
er, a continuous process. Next, as the trust to elites is low, the governing lead-
ers have no courage to implement non-popular reforms. An additional short-
coming is the lack of experience on the side of the elites and that leads to the 
creation of networks between state institutes or some of their incumbents and 
representatives of the black economy and as a consequence there is a lack of 
equality in front of the law, a lack of fairness and of good governance. Not 
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keeping to the rules of law on the side of some of the representatives of the 
state institutions, leads to similar behavior on the side of some of the citizens.  
These negative effects result in positive expectations towards EU, its sup-
port for democracy, establishment of firm democratic principles in the country 
and trust that European Union accounts as a factor for the success of social 
cohesion, solidarity and integration of its members. This contributes to the fact 
that till now the citizens are critical and requiring to national elites but their 
support to further European integration is stable. 
The paper presents an assessment of empirical data1 allowing divulge Euro-
peanness of elites through analyzing their feelings of attachment, trust to EU 
institutions, and the level of backing EU integration. Our expectations are that 
Europeanness is still not a philosophy and strategy, but rather an adaptation to 
the circumstances and a step-by-step learning to feel, cooperate and be Europe-
an. Due to that the processes of recognition of EU policies, trust to its institu-
tions and integration are dynamic (cf. this HSR Special Issue’s introduction, 
Vogel and Teruel 2016). 
2.  The Challenges of Bulgarian Transition 
In the course of twenty five years of transition, Bulgaria has undergone three 
key transformational phases: 1) Political – building a system of democratic 
governance; 2) Economic – transition from a centrally planned economy to 
market economy; 3) Constitutional – at the beginning of the transformation in 
1991 when a new constitution was accepted and the accession to the EU in 
2007. 
In the 1990-2015 period, Bulgaria has experienced 16 cabinets. None of the 
governments has won a second turn after being in power. Limited executive 
capacity has narrowed the adoption of reforms or, when accepted, they have 
been poorly implemented. Weak planning capacities and an underdeveloped 
use of scientific advice further limit the strategic capacities of Bulgarian gov-
ernments. 
After the parliamentary elections at the end of 2014, Bulgaria has a right 
oriented coalition government. That contributes to a stabilization of the country 
as after 2013 general elections the political situation in Bulgaria is marked by a 
continuous struggle between a fragile centre-left coalition government and a 
weak opposition as well as by growing conflicts within the right political par-
ties. The weak government and lack of consensus within the parliamentary 
parties represent a political context that has framed reforms such as economy, 
                                                             
1  The data presented in this paper comes from two projects: ENEC (2014) and IntUne (2007-
2009).  
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administration, pension, education and health care, and the debates on the depth 
of the European integration process. This political development has been ac-
companied by an ever-growing disenchantment of citizens with political parties 
and the performance of the governments. In the recent surveys the percentage 
of citizens satisfied with the ruling government in the country is 32%.2 It is not 
only the performance of the government and parliament that underpins this 
satisfaction rate; it is also a lack of information about public policy making and 
ineffective communication between the government and citizens. Strategic 
vision from government is hampered by the nature of a coalition government 
with narrow majorities and constant negotiations. Conflicts are often either 
resolved informally or allowed to block decision-making. There is no systemat-
ic thinking about institutional reforms and economic development. Methods to 
improve efficiency, such as regulatory impact assessments, are only introduced 
in response to EU prompting. 
In the elections of 2014 eight parties won seats in the parliament. The coali-
tion government is led by the party Citizens for European Development of 
Bulgaria (GERB), together with the Reform Block, supported by the Patriots, 
ABV (Alternative Bulgarian Renaissance) and the Democratic Centre. The 
other three parties – Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), Movement for Freedom 
and Rights (MFR) and Ataka remain in opposition. All the parliamentary par-
ties with the exception of Ataka, that has 11 parliamentarians from all the 240 
MP, are firmly oriented to deepening of the relations with EU. There are ten-
sions within the main political parties, which lead to instability in the political 
space, but they concern national issues. In the transition period, but severely in 
the last years, the key problem is corruption and ineffective anti-corruption 
measures (Guasti 2014; Aasland, Grødeland and Pleines 2012; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). These political developments are accompanied by 
an increasing public mistrust in political parties. Moreover, there are severe 
cases on the misuse of tax authorities to neutralize political rivals.  
As a whole, most citizens support democratic institutions and there are no 
important groups seeking to change the political system. However, there is a 
great mistrust that the elites are capable of implementing democracy in the 
governing process, especially since 2009 when the country was hit by a deep 
economic crisis. The problem is not the crisis as such, but the austerity 
measures which seem to affect the society disproportionally and the fact that 
simultaneously large scale corruption scandals reached the public.  
Although EU membership is positively perceived, one of the problems dur-
ing the accession negotiations was that law adoption did not translate into its 
implementation, whereby no reliable measurement tools were designed. In 
other words, adoption of the acquis communautaire does not automatically 
                                                             
2  <http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=152056> (Accessed 30 September 2015). 
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translate into real changes on the ground. However, efforts are made to make 
the EU believe not only that the changes are undertaken, but also, that they 
yield positive effects. The state strategies are to formally meet the EU require-
ments, while minimizing institutional adaptation costs (Andrey 2014, 103-24; 
Policy Public Procurement).3 Although Bulgaria is obliged to adjust to the 
prescriptive rules of the European law, it is free to decide on how to implement 
them in the national system. Insufficient implementation at the national level 
brings many problems and negatively affects democratic development.  
The case of Bulgaria proves how closely the concepts of integration and of 
democratization are interlinked and how important the balance between inte-
gration and keeping to the democratic rules is. The core actors of these process-
es are the national elites. They have now three significant functions – to coop-
erate with the national elites from the member states, to participate in the 
decision making process for significant transnational issues and to be mediators 
between their societies and the supranational EU governing bodies.  
3.  The Data for the Analysis 
Our objective in the following parts is to reveal the Europeanness of Bulgarian 
political, media, and social elites on the basis of descriptive and analytical 
discussions to compare the data from the three surveys mentioned above. 
We do not consider the degree of Europeanness, but how it transforms the 
problem solving capacity of member states toward effectively regulating trans-
national issues, such as economic and financial stability, immigration, envi-
ronmental protection, and so on. 
The set of questions concerns general relations between the countries and 
the EU. Is there an expansion of the trust in the period of integration, contrac-
tion or continuity? Do the legal and the institutional structures of the EU pro-
vide provision for solidarity or undermine the social capital proposing different 
access to resources and low transparency of its activities? If the states fail and 
there is a divide between the states and the representatives of the EU, are there 
mediators or networks that provide the collaboration? Is there, and if yes to 
what degree, isolation of some countries from the process of integration in the 
legal and institutional basis of the EU? Are some countries able to avoid mar-
ginalisation through intermediate organisations that are capable of developing 
sufficient power, authority and legitimacy for a voice in the EU political pro-
cess? We will address some of these issues in the next part on the case of Bul-
garian elites. 
                                                             
3  <http://www.csd.bg/artShowbg.php?id=17822>(Accessed 15 October 2016). 
<(http://www.csd.bg/artShowbg.php?id=17794> (Accessed 30 September 2016). 
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The analyses rely on data from surveys that are realized as standardized in-
terviews on a representative sample of parliamentarians, media and trade union 
activists. The IntUne surveys took place in 2007 and 2009 and ENEC – in 2014 
and the latter involves only political elites. 
4.  The Bulgarian Elite’s Europeanness: Some Dimensions 
4.1  Attachment to EU 
Firstly, we consider the attitudes of the interviewed elites to their region, to 
their country and EU. The trade union leaders are most attached to their region 
(very attached 75%, to the country very attached are 68% and to the EU 6%), 
the mass media elites are most attached to their country (37% very attached, to 
the region 29% and to the EU 11%) and the parliamentarians are also most 
attached to the country (89%, to the region 84% and to the EU 26%). The value 
of “somewhat attached” added to the “most attached” reveals that all groups are 
highly attached to the three levels – regional, country and European. Most 
probably more research is needed to go deeper to the explanations why there 
are some hesitations in the attachment values. We can compare the data from 
2009 with the data from 2007 only for the parliamentarians, as the other groups 
were not investigated in 2007. The comparison shows that the interviewed 
parliamentarians were most attached to the country (86%, to the region, 45% 
and to the EU 15%). There is no significant change in the length of the two 
years EU membership as the comparison reveals. However, there is a signifi-
cant decrease in the strong attachment to the region and also to the EU. That 
can be explained together with other justifications that the most important level 
for policy making for the parliamentarians remains the country level. The more 
emotional explanation can be looked for in the data for the significant identity 
characteristics. The data reveal that the acquired characteristic of a deep feeling 
of belonging to the nation is very important for the researched elites. The laws 
and rules are more important than such features as origin of the parents, cul-
ture, and religion. Simultaneously, the feeling, the loyalty to the nation has a 
very high support as 80% of the interviewed elites think that it is the very im-
portant characteristic to feel national. Although our next data set is from 2014, 
the conclusions are similar to those from 2009 as the interviewed parliamentar-
ians are attached and very attached to their region (98.1%), to Bulgaria 
(100.00%) and to Europe (83.00%).  
To analyze additionally the issue of national and European identity we will 
present the data about what is considered most important to be real Bulgarian 
and real European – religion, cultural traditions, to be born in the country, to 
have Bulgarian parents, to speak Bulgarian language, to respect the laws and 
regulations and to vote during the elections. The data support the conclusion 
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that the respect for the institutions and laws is considered the most important 
characteristic of the person who would like to be considered true national. In 
this regard there are no significant differences between the researched elite 
groups. Among the mass media elite on the second place comes the knowledge 
of the language as the most important identity characteristic which is explaina-
ble with regard of their professional affiliation while among the parliamentari-
ans this is the feeling of being Bulgarian (85%). The latter is the most im-
portant for the social elites as they put it on the first place (93%), even before 
the respect to the laws. This approach of the elites to the identity problem re-
veals an attempt to balance between modern understanding of national identity 
and a traditional one relying on patriotism, love and loyalty. The data from 
2007 reveals that the parliamentarians have placed in this period the emphasis 
on the same two characteristics and the most important, even if not significant-
ly different, is the feeling of being Bulgarian (86%) while the respect of the 
laws is most preferred by 82%. Other research in Bulgaria (Kostova 2005) has 
shown similar conclusions and this supports our empirical findings as reliable. 
In this regard, it helps to bring consistent data about the significance of reli-
gion, being born in a definite country, and having national parents as important 
characteristics in identity discussions. The elites in Bulgaria put less emphasis 
on the latter attributes requiring modern qualities to be of significant considera-
tion.  
The understanding of the researched elites toward European identity is simi-
lar to their comprehension of national identity. The respect to the laws (most 
significant according to 76% of the mass media elite, to 76% of the parliamen-
tarians and 87% of the social elites) and feeling of being European (most sig-
nificant according to 82% of the mass media elite, to 67% of the parliamentari-
ans and 75% of the trade union elites) are the attributes considered most 
important for European identification. The very close relation between Europe-
an and Bulgarian identity is best revealed by the data considering the feeling of 
only national or only European, on the one hand, and the combined identity – 
national and European, on the other. The majority of the researched elites per-
ceive themselves as this complicated double identity – Bulgarian and Europe-
an: 85% of the journalists, 81% of the trade union elites, and 75% of the par-
liamentarians.  
4.2  The Threats to the EU 
The issue of identity is connected with the unity of the European Union. A 
specific nuance in this regard is revealed by the attitudes of the elites to the 
threats toward the Union. To a definite extent, this depends on the specific 
potential threats that national elites feel. In this regard the Bulgarian elite, as 
every other national elite, considers their own powers, strengths, locality, privi-
leges and shortcomings. From this point of view the data from 2009 shows that 
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according to the Bulgarian elites the biggest threat for the unity are the eco-
nomic differences between countries, the propensity of member states to put 
their national interests first and the interference of Russia in European affairs. 
However, there are some differences between the different groups within the 
elite – the mass media and the trade union elites are considering these three 
threats as the most dangerous while for the parliamentarians the threat of eco-
nomic differences is not as significant as the enlargement including Turkey. 
The content behind this identification we will discuss further down. It is devot-
ed to the decision making process and its efficiency, to the barriers and encour-
agements in the process of integration. This is a difficult path and the data 
reveals that in a very clear way.  
In comparison, five years later, in 2014 the parliamentarians still consider 
that the greatest threat for the unity of the Union is the economic differences 
between various member states. The thread of Russia is on the second place 
and this is relevant as the relations with Russia were frozen at this period of 
time. However, the third significant thread is again the emphasis on national 
interests, but it divides the third place with two significant momentous prob-
lems as immigration, and the thread coming from an enlargement including 
Turkey. Yet, Bulgarian political elites in their majority (52.8%) do not consider 
an enlargement including Turkey as a thread. They consider it in the economic 
and geopolitical interest of the country Turkey to be a EU member. 
4.3  Policy Perspectives for the EU 
The data clearly shows that Bulgarian elites are not liberal. There are some 
differences between the groups as the mass media representatives rely on com-
petitiveness of economy than on social approach more often than the social and 
political elites (rely on competitive economy: 35% of the mass media elites, 
19% of the trade union elites and 23% of the political elites), but all the groups 
in their majority prefer the balance between social and liberal approach (rely on 
both competitive economy and social approach: 66% of the elites). The diffi-
cult years of the financial crisis have even deepen these attitudes and the politi-
cal elites interviewed in 2014 reveal that competitive economy is the choice of 
only 18.9% of them, while 41.5 would prefer the social approach and 32.1% 
choose the balance between economic and social line. 
4.4  Perceptions on EU Governance 
For the Bulgarian elite, the member states ought to remain the central actors of 
the European Union (54.7% agreement) and only 18% firmly think in 2009 that 
EC ought to become the true government of the European Union. However, the 
portion of the supporters of the latter idea increases to 45.3% at the end of 
2014. In this regard, the strongest support is from the side of the parliamentari-
ans and the weakest from the trade union leaders. The powers of the European 
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Parliament have to be increased significantly according to 15% of the re-
searched respondents in 2009 and 73.6% in 2014. To some extent the explana-
tion of these views could be justified by the effectiveness of the institutions. To 
a greater extent, the justification of this finding could be looked for in the com-
parison between national and European Union institutions’ performance. The 
most relevant explanation contributing to the increase of the approval, howev-
er, lies in the characteristics of the elite composition in 2009 and 2014. Accord-
ing to our data from 2014, almost half of the parliamentarians in 2014 are new 
to the parliament. These people know foreign languages, communicate actively 
with the institutions of the EU and expect deeper unification of the member 
states.  
It seems that Bulgarian parliamentarians appreciate the efficiency of Euro-
pean institutions. However, the interviews in 2014 reveal that still there are 
doubts about what is the better strategy – unified Europe in all aspects or a 
European Union in which member states are independent in the process of 
decision-making. The parliamentarians have arguments for both strategies. 
According to the interviewed elites, those who make decisions at the EU level 
do not take enough into account the interests of Bulgaria and this is the firm 
conviction of 15% of the mass media elite (together with the answer of some-
what agree this percent increases to 57%), of 6% (62%) of the trade union 
leaders and 9% (61%) of the parliamentarians in 2009 year survey. In 2014 we 
have interviews with parliamentarians and the comparison reveal that there is a 
significant increase of the portion of the political elites (75.5%) that consider 
that the interests of their country are not taken into significant consideration 
when important decisions are taken at EU level. More, it is perceived that the 
interests of some member states carry too much weight at the EU level. In this 
way think 27% of the mass media elites (together with the answer of somewhat 
agree this percent increases to 93%), 25% (94%) of the trade union activists 
and 25% (87%) of the parliamentarians in 2009. To a significant extent this is 
due to the effectiveness of the national elite to influence EU policy-decisions. It 
is obvious for the Bulgarian elite that the country is at the periphery of the 
European Union and has very little influence on the decision making process. 
This most probably contributes to the prevailing expectation for more united 
European Union. 
The impact of the parliament on the decision making process is considered 
as very ineffective by 32% of the media elites (78% if to the group is added the 
respondents for whom the effectiveness is rather low), by 33% (73%) of the 
trade union leaders and 14% (47%) by the parliamentarians in the survey from 
2009. Not more positive is the perception of the effectiveness of the govern-
ment as 13% of the media elites consider it very ineffective (75% together with 
the answer rather ineffective), 25% (69%) of the trade union leaders and 7% 
(46%) of the parliamentarians. The data reveal the perception that the parlia-
ment is quite incapable of influencing the decision making process at the EU 
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level. Even when the tools of media and/or lobbying are added, the effective-
ness is still considered very low.  
Does effectiveness influence the ideas of the elites about the enlargement of 
the European Union? It seems not to a significant extent, as 57% of the mass 
media elites and 70% from the trade union leaders and the parliamentarians 
consider the enlargement necessary for the Union in 2009. The data from 2014 
for the parliamentarians show no significant change as about 70% of the inter-
viewed elites consider it necessary that the enlargement of the European Union 
should continue.  
4.5  The Benefits of EU Membership 
Bulgarian elites as the majority of the elites in Europe recognize that their 
countries benefit from the membership. The perception of the European institu-
tions by the Bulgarian elite is similar to the average of all studied countries – to 
the European Parliament and respectively to the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers: 92.5% of the elites think that the country has benefited 
from the EU membership in 2009 and these are 91% of the interviewed parlia-
mentarians in 2014. In this regard we have a considerably united perception of 
the elite in the country.  
Most probably that is why the trust in European institutions is high. The 
trust to the European institutions in the survey of 2009 is substantial among all 
studied elite groups - political, mass media and trade union leaders. However, 
the trust of the political elite is higher in the European Parliament than the trust 
of the trade union and media elites and similar to the trust of the other groups 
toward the Commission and the Council of Ministers. There is no significant 
change in trust relations toward the European institutions in 2014. As we have 
seen in the survey of 2009 the political elites are less critical than the trade 
union and media elite. However, the trust of the parliamentarians in European 
Parliament – mean 8.9 (10 is highest trust), in European Commission – 7.2, in 
European Council – 6.8 is significant. As a whole, there is a more positive 
attitude to European institutions than to the national ones. There is a clear ex-
ternalization of relations – the Bulgarian elites rather trust European Union 
institutions than the Bulgarian ones.  
5. The Effects of Europeanness on Trust 
It is important to understand the significance of trust to soften the consequences 
of the reforms and the crises and their impact on social cohesion. The study of 
such tensions at multi-level structures (European, national, regional, or local) 
reveals that the Bulgarian elites trust the European institutions more than the 
Bulgarian ones as the presented data illustrate (Tables 1, 2).  
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Table 1: Trust in EP, EC, EC (on a score of 0-10, 10 – most trust) 
 Political Elites Mass Media Elites Trade Union Elites 
Trust in the European Parlia-
ment (mean) 6.33 5.49 5.79 
Trust in the European Commis-
sion (mean) 5.68 5.79 6.07 
Trust in the European Council 
of Ministers (mean) 5.77 5.52 6.16 
Number   76   48    16 
Source: IntUne, 2009. 
 
Our data provides reliable information on measuring trust. Our main hypothesis 
here is that the more recently the country has joined the EU, the more trustful 
people and the elite are to the European institutions to balance, to overcome the 
instability they face. The relations of trust have the tendency to change slowly 
but they are characterized with dynamics. In 2014 the same party is on power 
as in 2009, but it has formed a coalition government and is supported by five 
parties from all eight parliamentary represented parties. In this regard, it is not 
surprising that the trust of the interviewed parliamentarians in 2014 toward 
national parliament (mean – 7.3 from 10 being the highest point of trust), na-
tional government (mean of 7.1) and local governments (7.5) is significantly 
higher than according to the data of 2009.  
Table 2:  Trust in the Bulgarian Government (on a score of 0-10) 
Political, media or trade union elite? Mean Number Std. Deviation 
Political Elite 5.46 76 2.595 
Media Elite 3.31 48 2.362 
Trade Union Elite 3.94 16 2.294 
Total 4.55 140 2.667 
Source: IntUne, 2009. 
 
The data reveal that there are some variances between the differently oriented 
Bulgarian MPs expressed towards the European Commission and European 
Parliament (Table 3), who nevertheless trust them as institutions, may be ac-
counted for by the experience of the indirect but strong influence and leverage 
these institutions have over national decision-making, coupled with the re-
quirements imposed primarily by the Commission on Bulgaria during the lat-
ter’s journey towards accession to EU and its monitoring afterwards. 
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Table 3: Mean Score of Trust in EP and EC and Political Orientation 
Political Orientation of Bulgarian Elites 
 European Parliament European Commission 
Socialists 5.21 5.46 
Left Liberals 6.31 7.00 
Right Liberals 6.22 5.67 
Christian Democrats 7.00 7.00 
Conservatives 6.43 6.06 
Extreme Right  3.50 2.67 
Source: IntUne, 2009. 
 
Our data comparison from the survey in 2009 between Bulgaria and the other 
countries’ populations shows that the Bulgarians least trust their national insti-
tutions. On the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is a complete lack of trust, the mean 
for the Bulgarian population is 3.44. Close to Bulgaria is Poland (mean of 3.72) 
and very different is Denmark (7.46). More, the deviation from the average 
answer in the case of the Bulgarian population is the largest in comparison with 
the other studied countries and it confirms the thesis for a sharp division within 
Bulgarian society. The data show that all studied Eastern European societies 
trust less their national institutions in comparison with the trust to the national 
institutions of the Western European countries. The data for the trust to the 
national government is not very different. The lowest degree of trust is among 
the populations of Poland (3.70) and Bulgaria (3.73). The average mean for the 
degree of trust in the national parliaments is 5.47 and to the national govern-
ment – 6.53. The trust in local governments is higher in all countries in com-
parison to the trust in the national institutions. Bulgaria is again sharing the 
lowest positions as the mean of the trust in the local government is 5.25 and the 
average for all countries is 6.27. The lowest degree of trust in this case belongs 
to the Serbians (4.35). The data reveal that the Bulgarians are the ones whose 
trust in their national institutions is low.  
The mistrust is not so much a cultural characteristic but rather a result of 
historical experience. The empirical data for the trust in the European institu-
tions confirms that as the trust to the European Parliament is the highest among 
Bulgarian elite in comparison with the ones of the countries, involved in the 
survey. The mean for the trust in the survey in 2007 to European parliament 
among the Bulgarians is 7.61 and the average for the studied countries is 6.33. 
The Bulgarians trust very highly also the European Commission. The mean for 
trust among Bulgarians is 8.02 and the average for the studied countries is 6.53. 
These data suggest an externalization of trust to institutions outside the country 
in comparison with the deep degree of mistrust to national institutions.4   
An explanation for the trust relations of the elites to the European institu-
tions could be the frequency of visits to other European countries. Bulgarians 
                                                             
4   <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal 2013> (Accessed 10 January 2015).  
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are the least travelling in comparison with all studied countries. The data from 
the survey in 2009 show that only 12% of the Bulgarians have visited in the 
previous year other countries in the European Union while for the whole sam-
ple this average figure is 48.3%. Similar are the reactions of the elites. Their 
attitudes in 2014, as we have revealed, are changing as the communication with 
EU institutions are becoming regular and frequent. A further explanation one 
can look for is in the sociability of the respondents. Among Bulgarians only 
12% are members of trade union or other organizations, while the average 
figures for the sample are more than 15%.  
The conclusion from the data reveals that internationalization of polity 
economy and social environment contribute to the transnational influences. 
However, they have still not changed the national space in a considerable way. 
6.  Conclusions  
The recent development in Bulgaria is closely connected with the membership 
of the country in the European Union. The state has developed adequate politi-
cal, economic, and social institutions and at the same time has to adapt to the 
multilevel structures of governance at European level. From one side this 
means tremendous social changes inside the state and from another – adapta-
tion to international standards that are accepted as basic for the prosperous 
development of the country. While the inner country’s processes are character-
ized with the creation of multiparty system and market economy, the interna-
tional relations develop intensively leading to enlargement and transition to 
international governing structures and in this way to the broadening of the 
objective of democratization and enlarging the Union solidarity beyond the 
national boundaries.  
The EU integration and the path to this integration contributed considerably 
to the speed of the change of Bulgarian politics and politicians move toward 
more practical, reasonable and consensual politics. There are constant ups and 
downs in the process of Europeanization and our data and interviews show that 
there is a somewhat historical delay in Bulgaria when compared to the other 
members of the EU. The data reveal that the elites are dissimilar in perceiving 
some of the studied aspects of national and European spheres of political, eco-
nomic and social life and similar in opinions and attitudes in other fields. The 
greatest defenders of policies at regional level are the trade union leaders, most 
open to global influences are the mass media and the protectors of national 
decision-making and influence are the political elites.  
The attitudes of the elites reveal high satisfaction with the integration and 
some suspicion about the efficiency of the national policies. Although there is 
development toward consensus, the Bulgarian elites still lack experience, abil-
ity to transfer good practices, and capacity to control bad practices such as 
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corruption. This plays a part in the average levels of trust and satisfaction at the 
national governance level. 
The Bulgarian elites’ Europeanness is expressed in a high display of trust 
toward European institutions. However, their trust toward national ones is 
significantly lower. The explanations for these diversities are looked for in the 
continuity of historical experiences of trust in the state and its institutions, the 
short period of European Union membership, the discontinuity during the hard 
economic transformation and the deep social differences in society since the 
transition has begun. 
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